Research
Publications
Incentive Pay and Decision Quality: Evidence from NCAA Football Coaches (with Luke Taylor)
Applied Economics (2022), 54(30), pp. 3505-3520.
Using play-by-play American football data and panel data on head coach remuneration, we test whether a head coach’s incentive pay affects the quality of their decisions. We proceed by first estimating an ‘optimal strategy’ for first-down offensive plays, then investigate whether the gap between actual and optimal choices is affected by incentive pay. In contrast to merely looking at the outcome of an agent’s choice, our approach considers the decision environment and the resources available. We find a small, but significant, negative effect of incentive pay on decision quality. Critically, this effect is not found when looking at raw outcome measures.
Current Projects
The Effects of Cash-Plus Programs on Young Adults: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Los Angeles County
Accumulating research on young adulthood indicates increasing economic inequality in this stage of the life course relative to older adults and earlier cohorts of young adults. Young adults are also one of the least supported age groups in terms of the social safety net. In partnership with the Department of Social Services of Los Angeles County (LA DPSS), we seek to fill this gap in the social safety net. Using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) design, I am evaluating LA DPSS’s “TAYportunity + Guaranteed Income” program. Participants in the treatment group are receiving an unconditional cash transfer of $1,000 per month for 36 months and in addition have the opportunity to enroll in various educational and employment programs of their choosing. There are 300 individuals in treatment, and 650 in control.
This project has been registered with the AEA RCT Registry under the RCT ID AEARCTR-0011791. The pre-analysis plan can be found here.
Measuring the Impact of Pay Information Equity Laws on Worker Outcomes
How does “leveling the information playing field” between workers and firms during the hiring process impact worker outcomes? Prior to 2017, it was the case in all U.S. states that firms could ask applicants about their salary history during the interview and hiring process, which would enable the firm to obtain some sense of the applicant’s reservation wage. At the same time, however, firms were not obligated to provide information to applicants about the wages they would offer to the applicant if they were hired, creating an information disadvantage for workers in the labor market. Since then, several states have implemented pay information equity laws, either through salary history bans, wage transparency mandates, or both. This proposal seeks to explore whether these laws, which are intended to level the playing field for workers in the labor market and promote pay equity, have led to improved worker outcomes. This proposal presents a model to demonstrate how eliminating asymmetric wage information in the labor market through salary history bans and wage transparency laws can lead to higher wages in the labor market. Additionally, using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2010-2021, this paper uses an event study design to show that pay information equity laws have led to increased mean wages and increased wage dispersion in states where the laws have been enacted.